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Balance-of-powers arguments are ubiquitous in judicial opinions and academic
articles that address separation-of-powers disputes over the President’s removal
authority, power to disregard statutes, authority to conduct foreign wars, and much
else. However, the concept of the balance of powers has never received a satisfactory
theoretical treatment. Possible theories of the balance of powers are examined and all
are rejected as unworkable and normatively implausible. Judges and scholars should
abandon the balance-of-powers metaphor and instead address directly whether
bureaucratic innovation is likely to improve policy outcomes. Additionally, implications
for the underenforcement controversy are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
The central metaphor in judicial opinions that addresses a clash between
the Executive and Congress is the balance of power: the idea that neither
branch should be powerful enough to dominate the other. In American
constitutional law, the metaphor originates from Madison’s theory that
governments should be divided into three branches—executive, legislative,
and judicial—which must always remain in balance.1 Although Madison
meant all three types of power must not be held by one branch and did not
suggest the modern idea that incremental shifts in the balance of power could
be unconstitutional, Madison’s idea is frequently interpreted today to mean
that a particular balance must always be maintained and that it is the courts’
duty to maintain it.2
But what do courts do when they maintain the balance of power between
the Executive and Congress? What does this metaphor mean? The idea,
which at first glance seems geometrically precise, is elusive under close
inspection. Power is famously difficult to define. It is even harder to quantify
or assign “weight” to. Does balance of power mean that Congress and the
President possess the same amount of power? Or merely that both branches
play a role in determining policy outcomes (or some policy outcomes)? Or

1 The compulsory quotation is, “The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at
232 (James Madison) (David Wootton ed., 2003).
2 And, to be sure, the balance-of-powers idea was commonly associated with separation of
powers at the time of the Founding. See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 127-28 (1965) (“[T]he separation of powers has been urged . . . to establish a balance of
governmental powers [during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries].”).
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just that one branch can prevent the other from engaging in abuses (or certain
abuses)? Or just that efforts by one branch to implement policy will be
systematically questioned, criticized, or opposed by the other? A historical
perspective shows just how difficult it is to answer these questions. Scholars
agree that the Executive is immensely more powerful today than it was at the
Founding and has concentrated power at the expense of the judiciary and
Congress.3 Does that mean that the distribution of power among the branches
is “unbalanced,” and that courts must try to correct it by withdrawing power
from the Executive? At various points, notably starting with the New Deal,
Congress delegated vast powers to the executive branch so that officials
appointed by the President would be responsible for enacting and enforcing
regulations.4 Did these delegations weaken Congress by transferring powers
to the Executive or strengthen Congress by enhancing its ability to achieve
its goals? Technological change appears to have enhanced the power of the
Executive relative to that of Congress and the judiciary, providing the
Executive with additional means to gather information, persuade the public,
and enforce the law.5 Should the courts withdraw power from the Executive
in order to compensate for these advantages? Congress has grown in size from
ninety-one members in 1789,6 to 535 today. Did Congress become more powerful
as a consequence of its greater size, or weaker because of the difficulties of
cooperation among a large group of people? The party system was not anticipated

3 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 6-7, 50, 377, 418-19 (1973)
(describing how the imperial presidency, created by wars abroad, has intensified its domestic power,
while “[t]he great institutions—Congress, the courts, the executive establishment, the press, the
universities, public opinion—ha[ve] to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities”).
See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984 (5th ed.
1984) (positing that there is a long-term trend that consolidates power in executive individuals and
executive administrations).
4 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Courts, Federalism, and the Federal Constitution, 1920–2000, in
3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER
(1920—) 127, 140-41 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (providing an overview
of structural and functional shifts the New Deal brought to the federal government, particularly the
executive branch, vis-à-vis state and local governments).
5 See John Maxwell Hamilton & Kevin Kosar, How the American Government is Trying to Control
What You Think, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2015/09/24/the-new-propaganda-how-the-american-government-is-trying-to-control-what-youthink/ [https://perma.cc/23QC-YSXA] (describing how government agencies and the incumbent
President have used technology to shape public opinion); cf. Robert C. Power, Technology and the
Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-2
(1989) (describing how technology has enhanced law enforcement capabilities).
6 See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/history/
partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/GAA6-TDP5] (indicating that there were twenty-six Senate seats
in 1789); Congress Profiles, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, http://
history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/1st/ [https://perma.cc/SJ5X-EPBF] (noting that
there were sixty-five House seats in 1789).
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by the Founders. Is the balance of power upset when government is unified under
one party, or would the balance be unaffected or improved?
For a possible analogy, consider the role that “balance of power” plays in
the theory of international relations.7 Two states can be said to be at balance
when neither is strong enough to conquer the other and hence both refrain
from going to war. The potential benefits from victory are outweighed by the
risk of loss and the costs that must be incurred even if victory is secured. A
third country that seeks to ensure that neither country overwhelms the other
can lend military assistance to whichever country might fall behind in an arms
race, in this way maintaining the “balance of powers.” Here, the balance of
powers metaphor is helpful. Another analogy comes from an old constitutional
tradition originating in the ancient world, which reflected anxiety about
conflicts between the masses of ordinary people and the elites. A “balanced”
constitution was one that ensured that neither group was able to take advantage
of the other, and conflict between the two of them was minimized.8 In both
analogies, “balance” means peace, either external or internal, which can be
observed. By contrast, the Executive and Congress do not try to conquer each
other. They do not have territory that can be held or taken, nor do they have
resources that can be seized. Instead, they compete to influence public policy
outcomes. To determine whether their power is in balance, one needs a theory
as to how they influence those public policy outcomes, and what it means for
their influence to be equivalent. No such theory has ever been proposed.
In light of the difficulty of defining and measuring power, let alone
determining whether the power of different branches “balances,” one might
be skeptical of the Court’s assertion that its task is to maintain that balance
of power. In Morrison v. Olson, for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the statutory for-cause restriction on the Attorney General’s power to
fire an independent counsel infringed on executive power, but nonetheless
upheld the statute because the infringement was not significant in light of
other means of controlling the independent counsel at the President’s
disposal.9 By contrast, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that restricted the
President’s ability to fire members of an administrative body by giving both
those members and their bosses, the SEC Commissioners, for-cause
7 I borrow this analogy from Bentham. JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL FALLACIES 166 (Harold A. Larrabee ed., 1952). The Founders’ development of the
separation of powers framework was, in fact, influenced by balance-of-power theory in the
international relations context. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1446-48 (1987) (describing how the balance of powers in the Articles of Confederation
approximated a multilateral treaty among separate sovereign entities).
8 M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 107-08 (2d ed. 1998).
9 487 U.S. 654, 691-93, 695-96 (1988).
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protection.10 The Court’s reasoning is that a dual for-cause rule infringes
more on the President’s power than a single for-cause rule.11 But can anyone
reasonably believe that pension accountants charged with the task of
regulating private firms represent a greater threat to presidential power
than an independent counsel who can bring criminal charges against the
President and his advisors? President Clinton’s impeachment, instigated by
an independent counsel,12 should lay such a thought to rest.
In this Article, I supply a framework for analyzing claims about the
balance of power between Congress and the Executive.
Power is the ability to force people to act differently from how they would
otherwise act, usually by credibly threatening to harm their interests if they
do not act as desired.13 In the context of the U.S. government, one can
distinguish two dimensions of power. Vertical power refers to the power of
the government to coerce citizens.14 Horizontal power refers to the relative
vertical power of the different agents of government, conventionally divided
into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Executive has maximum
horizontal power if it possesses all the vertical power such that the legislature
and judiciary are unable to coerce citizens independently.
The balance-of-power idea refers to horizontal power, but, as I will argue,
it cannot be understood without reference to vertical power. A skewed
balance of power may be harmless if vertical power is limited, but it will be
dangerous if vertical power is great. One point I will make is that the debates
in the literature on the balance of power are so removed from practical
questions of governance that scholars and courts have lost sight of the social
consequences of their positions on the balance of power.
But the focus of my analysis is on horizontal power and the notion of
balance. I argue that the balance-of-power metaphor is not used consistently
in judicial opinions and academic articles, although I do not claim that the
concept of balance of powers is incoherent.15 My main goal is conceptual: to
10 561 U.S. 477, 486-87, 514 (2010).
11 Id. at 492, 494-95.
12 Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr’s OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 640-41 (1999).
13 One might define power more broadly to include the power to change people’s preferences.
See, e.g., RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 29-49 (The Free Press 1990) (1960)

(describing political power in terms of the power to persuade). I do not think this broader definition
would change my argument, while it would introduce some conceptual complications.
14 I do not use the term in the same way as Victoria Nourse, who uses it to refer to the relative
influence of different popular constituencies on the government. See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical
Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 752 (1999).
15 For arguments that the idea of balance of powers is incoherent because each branch is not a
monolithic whole, see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001).
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provide an account of the balance of powers and its role in constitutional
adjudication. To do this, I borrow some simple concepts from game theory,
which clarify what exactly “power” means. These concepts also make clear the
inconsistent ways that “balance of power” is used by the Supreme Court, and
I ultimately suggest that the metaphor is not useful. A more promising
approach is for the judicial department to address directly the social costs and
benefits of proposed changes to government structure that end up in court.
I. THE “BALANCE OF POWERS” IN THE COURTS
AND IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE
A. The Courts
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new agency called the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, which was given the authority to regulate
accounting firms.16 The Act lodged the Board in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and gave SEC commissioners the power to appoint and
remove the Board members subject to a for-cause standard.17 The SEC
commissioners themselves enjoy independence: the President can also
remove them only for cause.18 Thus, the Board is protected by a double layer
of insulation from presidential interference: Board members cannot be
removed by the President, but rather only by SEC commissioners for cause,
and SEC commissioners can only be removed by the President for cause.19
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the
Supreme Court held that this arrangement violated the separation of
powers.20 The Court said that although the presidential removal power can
be subject to certain constraints, including for-cause requirements, the dual
for-cause limitation went too far by impermissibly interfering with the
executive power to enforce laws.21

16
17

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012).
More precisely, the Court assumed that the Act did this. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 485-87 (2010).
18 There is no statute providing for the removal of SEC commissioners. HENRY B. HOGUE ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43391, INDEPENDENCE OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS
18-19 (2014). But the Supreme Court decided Free Enterprise Fund “with [the] understanding” that
SEC commissioners can be removed only for cause. 561 U.S. at 487. See also SEC v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he President has the power to remove [an
SEC] commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
19 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486-87.
20 Id. at 498. For some useful background, see generally Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers,
Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 485 (2009).
21 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492, 498.
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But how did the dual for-cause limitation go too far? One might take the
position, held by a number of commentators, that any provision limiting the
Executive’s power to remove is an impermissible restriction on executive
power.22 But the Supreme Court has never held that view.23 In Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, the Court upheld a statute that provided that the
President could not remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission
without cause.24 In Morrison v. Olson, the Court upheld a statute that provided
that the Attorney General could not remove independent counsel except with
cause.25 The Morrison Court blandly observed that although the statute no
doubt “reduces the amount of control or supervision that the Attorney
General and, through him, the President exercises over the investigation and
prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity,” the reduction was
incremental because the Attorney General and thus the President retained
various ways of exerting control over the independent counsel.26 The Court
in Free Enterprise Fund distinguished these cases on the grounds that the
Board was subject to a dual, rather than single, for-cause limitation.27 But it
did not explain why, if the incremental restrictions on executive power in
Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison were constitutional, the additional increment
created by the dual for-cause limitation went too far. Just how far is too far?
The Free Enterprise Fund Court did not answer this question. Instead, it
fell back on a line of thinking that, if taken literally, would require that
Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor be overturned.
In fact, the multilevel protection that the dissent endorses “provides a
blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power.” In a system of
checks and balances, “[p]ower abhors a vacuum,” and one branch’s handicap
is another’s strength. “Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself,”
therefore, it must not “impair another in the performance of its constitutional
duties.” Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, and even
existence of executive offices. Only Presidential oversight can counter its

22 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 597 (1994) (“The President’s power over nominations and his exclusively held
executive power strongly suggest that he must be able to remove federal officers who he feels are
not executing federal law in a manner consistent with his administrative agenda.”); see also Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1994)
(arguing that the Founders envisioned the President to have the ability to discharge, at will, an
official who “makes discretionary decisions about the content of public policy”).
23 Although Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), could be interpreted as reflecting such
a view, this interpretation was ruled out in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
24 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
25 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988).
26 Id. at 695-96.
27 Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492-94 (2010).

1684

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1677

influence. That is why the Constitution vests certain powers in the President
that “the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify.”28

Echoing Justice Scalia’s complaint in his dissenting opinion in Morrison that
“this statute does deprive the President of substantial control over the prosecutory
functions performed by the independent counsel, and it does substantially affect
the balance of powers,”29 the Court held that the dual for-cause restriction
encroaches on executive power.30 But the Court did not explain why ebbs and
flows in the relative power of the two branches have been tolerated in the past.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund also made no progress with
this question.
But even if we put all these other matters to the side, we should still conclude
that the “for cause” restriction before us will not restrict Presidential power
significantly. For one thing, the restriction directly limits, not the President’s
power, but the power of an already independent agency . . . . But so long as
the President is legitimately foreclosed from removing the Commissioners except
for cause (as the majority assumes), nullifying the Commission’s power to
remove Board members only for cause will not resolve the problem the Court
has identified: The President will still be “powerless to intervene” by removing
the Board members if the Commission reasonably decides not to do so.31

In this and related passages, Justice Breyer argued that the dual for-cause
restriction did not reduce presidential power “significantly”;32 indeed, it may
even have increased presidential power by giving the President a way to
commit not to interfere with policy choices ex ante where he might change
his mind ex post.33 Neither the majority nor the dissent explained how they
determined that the reduction in presidential power was “significant” or not.
The difficulties go deeper than either the majority or dissent admits.
One possibility, as recognized by the majority, is that the law enhances the
influence of Congress at the expense of the President because insulated
executive officials worry more about budget cuts than about being fired.34
Another possibility is that the Board’s insulation protects it from the
President and Congress, which loses the ability to demand that the President
sack an official who displeases it. If so, the dual for-cause restriction does not
affect the balance of powers. Indeed, the insulation could strengthen the

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 500 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
487 U.S. at 714-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492, 498.
Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 499-500 (majority opinion).
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President’s hand since the President could no longer fire officials that
Congress dislikes.
Morrison and Free Enterprise Fund also fail to address another question:
What is the baseline for determining when a reduction in presidential power
goes too far? This issue received no attention from the majority or dissent
in Free Enterprise Fund, and only the briefest mention in Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Morrison.
That is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among Congress,
the President, and the courts in such fashion as to preserve the equilibrium the
Constitution sought to establish—so that “a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department,” can effectively be resisted.35

While Scalia appeared to identify the benchmark balance of power as that which
prevailed at the time of the Founding, he did not explain what that balance of
power was—that is, who had how much power relative to whom.36 As a result,
we do not know whether the constitutional equilibrium would have prevailed if
the independent counsel statute had been struck down by Morrison. If the
Executive had become too powerful relative to the Founding-era baseline, then
the statute would have helped reinstate the proper equilibrium rather than upset it.
The silence of the opinions on the location of the constitutionally–permissible
balance of power is notable. The opinions evade this issue by implicitly taking
the status quo at the time that the statute was enacted as the baseline for
comparison. In Free Enterprise Fund, the majority argued that the dual for-cause
requirement was unprecedented,37 while the dissent insisted that it did not differ
meaningfully from restrictions in the statute book.38 In Morrison, the majority
pointed out that the President retains other means for controlling the
independent counsel,39 while the dissent argued that those other means were not
sufficient.40 The implied baseline in both cases was the status-quo balance of
power. But why should the status quo matter? An originalist like Justice Scalia
presumably would have believed that the balance of power at the Founding
should be the constitutional baseline. Others might take a different position, but
few people would likely argue that the constitutional balance of powers is
whatever the balance of power exists at any given time. Certainly, no court has
explicitly made this claim.

35
36

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Scalia’s opinion also rests on purely formalist grounds, and it is not clear how much weight
he gives to the balance-of-power idea.
37 561 U.S. at 494-96.
38 Id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
39 487 U.S. at 692-93.
40 Id. at 706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Balance-of-power reasoning in one form or another exists in numerous
other cases involving the separation of powers.41 It also can be found in other
areas of constitutional law, such as in cases involving federalism.42 The
opinions in these cases are no more illuminating than those in Free Enterprise
Fund and Morrison.
B. The Academic Literature
With some important exceptions, the academic literature has accepted the
balance-of-powers framework. Cass Sunstein provides a characteristic statement
of this view in the course of criticizing Justice Holmes’s argument that courts
should not adjudicate separation of powers disputes.
In its usual form, [Holmes’s position] amounts to a wholesale abandonment
of the separation of powers, and its belief in a self-calibrating institutional
equilibrium, based on the supposedly equal power of the opposing forces, is
without historical or theoretical support. There is good reason to suppose
that without adequate controls one branch will sometimes exercise too much
power over the others. One of the purposes of the Constitution was to prevent
that outcome and to check imbalances when they occur. Acquiescence by one
branch to a redistribution of national powers may not prevent—indeed it may
increase—the danger that the new arrangement will jeopardize some of the
purposes that underlie the constitutional structure.43

41 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In
this respect the [separation of powers] operates on a horizontal axis to secure a proper balance of
legislative, executive, and judicial authority . . . . By increasing the power of the President beyond what
the Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the
separation of powers seeks to secure.”); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995)
(deciding that it is an encroachment on the judiciary’s power for Congress to “declare by retroactive
legislation that the law applicable . . . [is] other than what the courts said it was”); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that congressional delegation of the Sentencing Commission
to the judicial branch does not “upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the
coordinate Branches”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he role
of this Court should be limited to determining whether the Act so alters the balance of authority among
the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic division between the lawmaking
power and the power to execute the law.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer if the Court
refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively immune from
judicial review, at the expense of Congress.”) (footnote omitted).
42 In these cases, the Court claims that a balance of power must exist between the national
government and the states. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 179 (2010) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“The purpose of this design is to preserve the ‘balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government . . . [that] protect[s] our fundamental liberties.’”) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). But this is a topic for another article.
43 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 495 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
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To avoid such imbalances, Sunstein favors enabling courts to strike down
statutes that undermine the values protected by the separation of powers.44
This type of thinking is often associated with the “functionalist” position
on separation of powers, which embraces judicial enforcement of separation
of powers to maintain a balance of power among the branches.45 But the
“formalist” position, in which each branch must exercise its characteristic
power absent explicit deviations in the Constitution,46 is arguably based on
balance of powers as well. The only difference is that the formalist believes
that the Founders determined the correct balance for all time by establishing
simple rules that allocate powers, while the functionalist wants to revisit the
balance of powers whenever a dispute among the branches occurs.47 The
formalist can argue that her position allows courts to avoid the futile task of
determining the optimal balance of power every time a challenge occurs, but
the price to be paid for this advantage is that we end up trapped in the
eighteenth-century balance of power that is of little relevance for today, and
in any event no longer prevails.48
Moreover, in order to avoid the charge of irrelevance, some formalists
have relied on an idea roughly similar to the concept of balancing.49 This is
the idea that the Constitution prohibits “the encroachment or aggrandizement
of one branch at the expense of the other,”50 where “encroachment” means
one branch taking on the essential function of another branch in the absence
of textual authorization. For example, statutory restrictions on the removal
power amount to unconstitutional encroachment because they involve an
effort by Congress to restrict executive power, where the power to remove is
assumed to be a feature of executive power. This approach reintroduces
indeterminacy into the formalist argument and may be inconsistent with the
premises of formalism, as John Manning has argued.51 But I will not further
address this issue and instead will focus on the balance of powers.
In the academic debate on the independent counsel statute, scholars echo
the majority and dissent in Morrison, arguing back and forth as to whether the

44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 509-10.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 232.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 233.
A formalist could also deny that the rules contained in the Constitution have anything to do
with balance at all, or that it is irrelevant from the formalist perspective why the Founders designed
the rules in the way they did—whether to achieve “balance” or something else.
49 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1959-60 (2011) (discussing how “formalists subscribe to the idea that the Constitution adopts a
freestanding separation of powers doctrine” that derives from the general constitutional structure).
50 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
51 See generally Manning, supra note 49.
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statute took too much power from the Executive and gave too much power to
Congress. For instance, Abner Greene argues,
There is, though, a justification for the Morrison result that is perfectly
consonant with the original balance of powers theme, with the framers’
concern with corruption and self-dealing within any branch of government.
The Ethics in Government Act can be seen as intruding into executive power
precisely when executive power fails to operate—when the Executive has, in
effect, exempted itself from the execution of the laws.52

On this view, the Framers envisioned an original balance of powers in which
the Executive’s power to dominate other branches of government was in part
balanced by Congress’s power to enact laws that constrain it. President
Nixon’s presidency became too powerful when he refused to enforce the laws
that executive officials had broken. The independent counsel statute restored
this balance by creating a mechanism that ensures enforcement when the
President’s interests are at stake.
By contrast, Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo argue,
[P]ermitting Congress to place limits on the President’s removal power
threatens to upset the Madisonian conception of the separation of powers,
which envisions all three branches constantly engaged in a state of dynamic
tension. By reducing the President’s role in this balance, limitations on the
removal power inevitably tip the balance in Congress’s favor.53

Calabresi and Yoo argue that in Clinton v. City of New York, in which the Court
invalidated the line-item veto,54 the Court’s holding reflected the view that:
Even though Congress had voluntarily surrendered its own power and had
acted out of the laudable desire to . . . reduce government spending, the
change still would have taken the legislative branch out of this process of
dynamic tension that the Framers regarded as the best safeguard for liberty.55

But this is not true. The legislative branch would have remained in the
“process,” as it must enact legislation before the President can veto line items.
Similarly, in Morrison, the Executive remains in the “process” of removing

52 Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123, 176 (1994).
53 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 103, 117 (2009) (footnote omitted); see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power
Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377, 1400 (1994) (“Yet, the apparently lesser power [of making an office
independent] is not actually a lesser one since its exercise involves changing the constitutional
balance of power whereas congressional creation of new offices does not.”).
54 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).
55 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 53, at 117.
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officials or controlling the bureaucracy even if his decisions are restricted by
the “for cause” rule.
The two sides of the debate simply differ in their assessment as to whether
the independent counsel weakens the President, or whether any weakening
of the President is justified by public policy considerations, including those
underlying the theory of the separation of powers. Because neither side offers
empirical evidence or even alludes to the type of empirical evidence that
could resolve their disagreement, the debate is fruitless.
Scholars make similar balance-of-power arguments about the other types
of clashes between Congress and the Executive, including the disputes over
the legislative veto,56 delegation of power to the executive branch,57 the
establishment of special tribunals,58 the line-item veto,59 executive dominance
of foreign relations,60 sentencing guidelines,61 judicial deference to agency
interpretations,62 and the impact of the party system on the structure of
government.63 A number of recent articles and books claim that the Bush
56
57
58

See infra subsection IV.B.2.
Greene, supra note 52, at 154.
See generally Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV.
561 (2001) (suggesting proposals to reform the Executive’s clemency power and potential balance of
power challenges to two of the proposals—i.e., direct congressional regulation of the President’s
clemency power and increased judicial scrutiny of the President’s clemency decisions on public
policy grounds).
59 See generally Antony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal Balance of
Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469 (1994) (exploring the need for an executive line-item veto,
proposals for a constitutional line-item veto amendment, and the dangers of a broad line-item veto
power for the balance of power among the federal branches of government).
60 See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking,
54 UCLA L. REV. 309 (2006) (describing how Presidents have used the Constitution’s relative
silence regarding the distribution of foreign affairs powers to create and unilaterally enforce foreign
affairs obligations of the United States under international law, as well as assert domestic lawmaking
authority to advance executive branch preferences in foreign affairs).
61 See generally Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and
Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 581 (1992). Tushnet is skeptical about
whether judges or anyone else can actually conduct balance-of-powers analysis, but gamely tries to
do so himself. Id. at 585 (“Judges simply are not in a good position to determine whether an
innovation is likely to have adverse long-term effects on the balance of powers, because they are not
likely to know enough about how those effects might occur.”).
62 See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (positing that the Court repeatedly—e.g., in
determining who holds the interpretive authority for organic statutes (i.e., Chevron), who may
appoint agency heads and who may approve them, whether agency actions may be disapproved by
formal legislative action short of the full lawmaking process, and whether the reasons for agency
enforcement strategy may be subjected to judicial scrutiny—has decided in favor of the President
and the agency, and against the possibility of an external check by Congress or the judiciary).
63 See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006). Levinson and Pildes do not explicitly endorse the balance-of-powers
approach, but they assume it is correct for the purpose of making a number of normative proposals.
Id. at 2347-49, 2354-59.
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Administration expanded executive power at the expense of Congress.64
Many other examples of scholarship linking balance of powers to substantive
areas of the law can be found.65 All of these arguments are variations on the
theme that the Executive (or in some cases Congress) has overreached,
thereby upsetting the balance of power, resulting in the need for the other
branches to assert themselves more aggressively to rebalance the distribution
of power. But in none of these case are authors able to show that the balance
of power was “upset.” They only demonstrate that one branch gained at the
expense of another branch (and even these claims are disputed), not that the
gain was excessive. Moreover, there is rarely attention to how an advantage
in one area—for example, the invalidation of the legislative veto,66 which
favored the Executive—might be counterbalanced by a disadvantage in another
area—for instance, approval of restrictions on removal,67 which favored
Congress.68 Or for that matter, how changes in purely formal powers are
affected by general political considerations like the temporary popularity of the
President after a successful war or unpopularity after a random gaffe or scandal.

64 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
90-93, 95-99 (2010) (attacking the rise of signing statements and increased reliance on the Office of
Legal Counsel during the Bush presidency); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 112-42 (2009) (outlining unprecedented
expansions of executive power during the George W. Bush Administration). For the contrary view,
see JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11 38 (2012), conceding that while the Bush policies implemented in 2001 and 2002 expanded
executive power in the national security arena, Congress and the judiciary “pushed back . . . like
never before in our nation’s history.”
65 See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938) (arguing that the
bureaucracy may preserve the balance of powers); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006) (“[T]he existing approach of separation of powers
in criminal matters cannot be squared with constitutional theory or sound institutional design.”);
Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the
Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 707-15 (2006) (positing that Congress has delegated
excessive power to the judiciary by transferring authority to agencies which the judiciary
supervises); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2322-27 (2006) (proposing an “internal” separation of powers within
the executive branch achieved through overlapping agency directives); Victoria F. Nourse & John P.
Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. REV. 273, 287-88 (2011)
(reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)) (arguing that the unitary executive
theory provides the Executive with a means for increasing its power).
66 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (rejecting the use of a legislative veto on
constitutional, balance-of-power grounds).
67 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (approving congressional limitations on the
removal power of the Attorney General, which limits presidential control over independent counsel).
68 But see infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
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Only a few scholars have questioned the logic of the balance of powers.69
A number of Articles have addressed the accuracy of its premises.70 Sai Prakash
criticized the balance-of-powers idea in part on the basis of its indeterminacy.71
And Elizabeth Magill subsequently advanced several cogent criticisms in an article
devoted to dismembering the concept.72 Magill argued that balance-of-powers
arguments are fatally flawed because it is impossible to determine the extent
to which any statute or action affects the balance of power.73 We lack a
normative benchmark for evaluating claims about the balance of power and
the branches are composed of individuals who represent diverse constituencies,
so that a balance among different groups of the public can exist even if one
branch dominates governance.74
Although I share Magill’s skepticism, I believe that her criticisms go too
far and that the kitchen-sink scope of her argument may have limited its

69 See, e.g., Magill, supra note 15, at 656 (“The basic failing [of the questions we ask to
appropriately distribute government authority] is a mismatch between the nature of the distribution
of government authority and [separation of powers,] the doctrine that purports to evaluate that
distribution.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 581-82 (1984) (“Once one descends below the level of the
branch heads named in the Constitution—Congress, President, and the Supreme Court—separation
of powers ceases to have descriptive power.”). To be sure, many scholars have raised questions about
whether the system of separation of powers produces good outcomes relative to other possible
systems. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000)
(“I reject Westminster as well as Washington as my guide and proffer the model of constrained
parliamentarianism as the most promising framework for future development of the separation of
powers.”); Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. L. REV. 1417,
1442 (2010) (“[U]niversal institutional ambition may be the best of the attainable regimes [under a
separation of powers framework], even if universal self-restraint would be best of all.”). But my focus
here is specifically on the logical and normative coherence of the balance of powers.
70 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.
915, 951, 959 (2005) (arguing that separation of powers assumes that the branches will seek to
maximize power, but observing that there is no reason to believe that the temporary occupants of
the branches will internalize goals of institutional aggrandizement); Levinson & Pildes, supra note
63, at 2356 (noting that, for “[a]t least the heirs of Jacksonian realism,” separation of powers depends
on “the actual political dynamics between the legislative and executive branches” and “these
dynamics, in turn, depend centrally on political parties”).
71 See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-47
(1998) (suggesting that balance-of-powers arguments do not help resolve the constitutionality of the
line-item veto); see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 572 (2012) (“[C]laims about interbranch imbalances and executive lawlessness
are question-begging and shed more heat than light.”). In Prakash’s view, balance-of-powers doctrine
has no basis in the constitutional text. Id. at 573.
72 See generally Magill, supra note 15. The criticism was made even earlier by Jeremy Bentham.
See BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 163-67. Various other observers and commentators in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries have also criticized the idea. See VILE, supra note 8, at 127-28 (noting
eighteenth and nineteenth century critics of the balance-of-powers approach).
73 Magill, supra note 15, at 604-05.
74 Id. at 608-626, 633, 645-49.
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influence.75 It is possible to provide a conceptually coherent account of the
balance of power, or to compare the balance of power created by a statute with
some benchmark, constitutionally proper balance of power. However, once
one achieves this conceptual clarity—and that is the goal of this Article—it
becomes clear that the skepticism underlying Magill’s argument is correct:
the balance of power is both normatively suspect and almost impossible to
apply in a systematic matter for the purpose of approving or rejecting legal
innovations in administrative structure.
II. ANALYZING THE BALANCE OF POWER
A. Concepts
The complex relationship between rules and outcomes can be illustrated
with a simple game theory example. In the divide-the-dollar game, two
players, Alice and Bob, must agree on how to divide a single dollar. If they
agree, they share the proceeds. If they do not agree, the dollar is destroyed.
Consider two versions of the game. In the first version (called the dictator
game), Alice has the unilateral power to offer a particular division; Bob can
only accept or reject. If Alice and Bob are both rational, Alice will keep 99 cents
for herself and offer 1 cent to Bob—which we designate (99,1) for (Alice,
Bob)—and Bob will accept. Bob will accept because he prefers 1 cent to
nothing. Anticipating this response, Alice offers 1 cent rather than 98 cents, 50
cents, or any other amount, because that offer gives her the highest payoff.76
In the second version (let us call it the take-turns game), Alice makes the
first offer, but Bob now has the choice to respond by making a counteroffer,
whereupon Alice can either accept or make another counteroffer, ad
infinitum. With each subsequent offer, the value that can be divided falls
by 1 cent, reflecting the cost of delay (receiving a payoff today is better than
receiving a payoff in the future). For example, if Alice offers (99,1), and
Bob makes a counteroffer, Bob could respond with (1,98), (2,97), (50,49),
or any other combination that adds up to 99 cents. In this game, the most
plausible equilibrium is one in which Alice offers (50,50) in the first round
because she fears that Bob will reject an offer that gives him less than half,
and Bob accepts.77
75 Magill’s article has not dammed the flow of balance-of-power arguments in the scholarly
literature or the courts. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
76 See Gary E. Bolton et al., Dictator Game Giving: Rules of Fairness Versus Acts of Kindness, 27
INT’L J. GAME THEORY 269, 270 (1998) (“The standard economic analysis of the dictator game
pivots on the assumption that individuals prefer having more money to having less . . . .”).
77 This is related to the Rubinstein bargaining model. See generally Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect
Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982). The actual analysis is a great

2016]

Balance-of-Powers Arguments

1693

So given a basic setup—two players, a set of rules, and payoffs—we can
isolate the effect of a change in the rules. In the dictator version of the game,
the rule is that Bob must either accept or reject Alice’s offer. In the take-turns
version, the rule is that Bob may make a counteroffer, and then Alice may
respond. The change in the rule results in a change in the outcome: (99,1)
versus (50,50). The concept of “bargaining power” is often used in this
context to distinguish the relative positions of the two persons under the
different rules. In the first example, Alice has all the bargaining power. In the
second example, neither Alice nor Bob has bargaining power.
Bargaining power, under this conception, refers to the ability of one party
to extract a greater-than-equal portion of the surplus that she generates through
cooperation with the other. As the discussion has illustrated, bargaining power
can change as a result of a change in the rules. One can usefully start with a
benchmark distribution of bargaining power, and then use it to evaluate
changes in the rules. For example, suppose that we believe that Alice and Bob
should have no bargaining power: they should always split the surplus. To
ensure that this happens, we use the take-turns rule. Now if someone proposes
a switch to the dictator rule, a possible response is that such a change would
upset the balance of power between Alice and Bob, allowing Alice to obtain
nearly the entire surplus when she ought to receive only half.
This paradigm is not the only way to think about the balance of power,78
but it is a useful starting point. It captures the idea that the balance of power
is important because it leads to outcomes we care about, and that the balance
of power is itself determined by the underlying rules that control parties’
behavior. Moreover, the assumption that balance of power means equal
bargaining power (that is, no bargaining power for each party) captures the
connotation of fairness and equilibrium.
B. Form Versus Substance
In the example above with Alice and Bob, a change in the rules predictably
produces a change in outcomes, but that need not be the case. A change in
the rules might not lead to a change in outcomes; and a change in outcomes
can result without a change in the rules. Examples of both cases follow.
A change in the rules does not necessarily change outcomes. Consider the
take-turns version of the game again, where Alice offers (50,50) and Bob
accepts. Suppose that an external agent changes the rules of the game by
deal more complicated, and two qualifications should be noted. First, the division of the payoffs
depends on the ratio of the players’ discount factors. Id. at 108. In the text, I assume they are
equal. Second, I assume equal division is the equilibrium, but in the Rubinstein model, there may
be multiple. See id. at 107.
78 For other ways that balance of powers is discussed, see infra Section II.C.
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giving Bob the option to inflict a negative payoff of 100 on Alice after she
makes her offer, if he pays a fee of 10. From a formal perspective, the rule
change favors Bob. He now has the option to do something that he could not
do before. However, the rule does not change the outcome of the game. Bob
prefers an outcome of (50,50) to an outcome where he decreases his payoff to
inflict disproportionate loss on Alice.79 Accordingly, he accepts Alice’s offer
rather than exercise the option to inflict the sanction.
Outcomes may change without a change in the rules. Again, consider the
take-turns version of the game. Suppose that Alice becomes famous and
beloved among the public, while Bob becomes extremely unpopular. Suppose
further that the public will punish Bob with a sanction of -100 if he rejects an
offer from Alice. Now, Alice will offer (99,1) and Bob will accept it in the first
round in order to avoid the sanction of -100. In game theory terms, we have
simply changed the payoffs; the change in payoffs leads to a change in
behavior even though the rules themselves did not change.
The lesson is that a change in the rules (a change in form) is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for a change in outcomes (a change in substance).
Let us consider this example in the context of the Executive (instead of
Alice) and Congress (instead of Bob). The President and Congress receive
positive payoffs if they agree on a policy but they bargain over how the payoffs
are divided, and payoffs decline with delay. Thus, the divide-the-dollar model
accurately describes the context of their interactions. Suppose further that
the Constitution establishes the rules of the take-turns game, and the
Founders implemented those rules because they sought to divide political
payoffs equally between the President and Congress.
One way to think about this is to imagine that Congress and the President
interact at specified moments on a timeline. Every time they interact, they
can produce a new law or not. If they produce a new law, they generate a
surplus for themselves. If the constitutional rules produce the same balance
of power as the take-turns game does, then, whatever the surplus in any given
action, Congress and the President each receive half of it. So their payoffs
are: (50,50) in period 1, (50,50) in period 2, and so on.
Now suppose that one day the rules change. A simple example is that the
Supreme Court announces that Congress can create an independent counsel
with the power to investigate the President. Suppose that before this
announcement, it was understood that Congress lacked the power to do this.

79 The actual analysis is a bit more complex. One must start at the end of the game and work
backward. And for an infinite game, one can define an arbitrary subset of the game and demonstrate
that neither party possesses a profitable deviation from some given strategy in that subset to show
that the strategy is optimal. In this example, whenever Bob has the option, he will not use it because
his payoff from using it is lower than his payoff from making a different move.
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The new rule permitting an independent counsel is akin, albeit at a more
modest level, to the change of the rule from take-turns to dictatorship (in
favor of Congress, not the President). Now once the Supreme Court permits
the congressional appointment of independent counsel, it may become
possible for Congress to threaten the President with harassing investigations
unless the Executive gives Congress a greater share of the surplus. From a
formal standpoint, there is a change in the rules.
But whether the new rule actually gives Congress greater bargaining
power depends on the political context in which it operates. Suppose it turns
out that while the counsel can harass the President (generating a payoff of 100
for the Executive), use of the counsel also injures Congress by distracting the
President from implementing laws that Congress cares about or riling up the
public against Congress (generating a payoff of -10 for Congress). Thus, while
the Supreme Court has given Congress a new power by changing the rules in
Congress’s favor, it does not change payoffs. The President is injured in a
formal sense but not in a substantive sense.
As noted above, bargaining power and outcomes are determined by the
political context as well as the rules. And so as we saw before, bargaining
power and hence outcomes can change even though there is no formal change
in the rules. Suppose the President becomes extremely popular after a war,
and now the public gets angry whenever Congress fails to cooperate with the
President’s program. Even though the rules have not changed, Congress may
receive a payoff of -100 if it refuses to enact a law proposed by the President,
so now the President can propose laws that greatly favor his own agenda (99,1)
and Congress will cooperate. The rules have not changed—outcomes have.
Thus, it should be clear that the effect of the independent counsel rule
could vary over time. Perhaps in period 1, the President is popular; Congress
cannot use the independent counsel power because of the risk of a public
backlash. But in period 2, the President loses popularity, and now Congress
can use the independent counsel to coerce a larger share of the surplus from
the current interaction. By now, it should be clear that the relationship
between form (the rules) and substance (the outcomes) is complicated.
Changing the rules does not necessarily change outcomes, and outcomes can
change despite an absence in the change of rules.
Now let us consider a third example. Suppose the independent counsel
rule makes it easier for the President and Congress to pass laws by
enhancing public trust. We could represent this effect by stipulating that
the law would increase the joint payoff from 100 to 200 in any particular
period. In principle, the parties could divide the payoff (100,100). But
suppose that it costs nothing for Congress to use the counsel and—fearing
the counsel—the President gives Congress a greater share of the surplus,
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say (80,120), whenever they bargain over and reach agreement on various
policies. Note that in this example, (1) the rule changes, (2) the President
and Congress both enjoy higher payoffs than before, but (3) Congress gains
more than the President does.
From a substantive standpoint, one might object to the independent
counsel rule because the payoffs become unequal, or approve of it because
the overall outcome is superior. One’s views might also depend on exactly
what distribution is produced. For example, one might object to (80,120)
because the inequality is too extreme, but approve of (99,101) because the
inequality is less extreme and a surplus is being generated. One’s sense of
an appropriate division could also depend on a historical benchmark. If one
believes that the Founding era or another relevant benchmark established a
division of (40,60), then distributions consistent with that division, even
though unequal, may be appropriate. There are other possible ways to
evaluate this rule, and we turn to them now.
C. Balance of Power in the Case Law
Balance-of-power arguments in the Supreme Court typically arise in two
instances: first, when Congress passes a law that appears to either take power
from the Executive or to give additional power to it; and second, when the
Executive engages in some action that is not clearly authorized by a statute.
In all of these cases, it is possible to make a formalist argument that the statute
or action violates the constitutional rules. Formalist arguments do not rely on
the balance of power, which is a substantive idea. If the Court decides to
resolve the dispute on formalist grounds, it holds that the rules were broken
or not broken, and that is the end of it.
For example, in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia argued that
the independent counsel statute is unconstitutional because it deprives the
President of full control over an official who is authorized to conduct a
criminal investigation, an act of executive power.80 For Scalia, the rules
provide that the President must control officials who engage in criminal
investigations. By depriving the President of the power to remove the
independent counsel, the independent counsel statute breaks the rules. No
discussion of the change in the balance of the power between the President
and Congress, if there is any, is warranted.
Complexities arise when the Court decides to resolve the dispute on
substantive grounds. It becomes necessary to appeal beyond the rules, and
it frequently happens that the Court appeals to the balance of powers.

80

487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Before discussing the cases, I identify some possible ways of thinking about
whether a rule or action violates the balance of powers:
 Minimalist: The rule of action is consistent with the balance of
powers as long as there remains a way for another branch to check
the active branch.
 Equal: The rule or action is consistent with equal balance of powers,
or converts a previously unequal balance to an equal balance.
 Historical: The rule or action is consistent with, or results in, the
balance of powers that existed at the time of the Founding (or other
historical benchmark).
 Pareto: The rule or action improves outcomes for both the President
and Congress, though it may give one or the other an advantage.
 Prioritarian: The rule or action results in payoffs that are (1) equal for
the two branches, or (2) such that deviations from inequality may be
justified if the increase in payoffs for the worse-off party is great enough.
 Status-quo-consistent: The rule or action does not change the status
quo balance of powers.
All six approaches to the balance-of-power analysis can be found in
Supreme Court cases.81 The minimalist approach is one interpretation of
Madison’s argument that no single branch should accumulate all powers.82
Many of the cases reflect this belief. In Morrison, for example, the court
upheld the independent counsel statute because the President appoints the
Attorney General, and thus can use that power of appointment to influence
who is ultimately chosen as independent counsel,83 at least in theory. The
mere existence of a possible check satisfies the balance of power.84
However, Morrison and cases like it can be interpreted to require
something more. The Morrison majority approved the independent counsel
statute because the executive branch retains “sufficient control over the
independent counsel.”85 The majority believes that the for-cause provision
is not important enough to unbalance the relationship between the
Executive and Congress, even if it formally impinges on the rules as Scalia
saw them. It is, however, not clear which version of the substantive
definition the majority uses. The most likely possibility is that the majority
81
82
83
84

See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
487 U.S. at 671-72.
The minimalist conception plays a large role in the academic commentary. Defenders of
executive power in various contexts—including Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, Adam Cox, and Cristina
Rodríguez—identify checks on the President’s power without trying to show that the checks are
sufficient from the standpoint of a relevant substantive baseline. See infra notes 166-70 and
accompanying text.
85 487 U.S. at 696.
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saw the public advantages of the independent counsel and thought that
they outweighed any marginal harm to executive power.86 This is
consistent with the Prioritarian view. Or the majority may have thought
that the constraints the statute put on the Executive were practically nil,
in which case it believed that the statute did not harm the balance, as per
the Equality or the Status-quo-consistent view.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund also reflects a substantive
view. First, he points out that Presidents never test the for-cause clauses
in various statutes by trying to fire people.87 Perhaps the President never
really needs to do so because his subordinates want to please him even if they
do not fear being fired. If that is the case, the rules do not reduce the President’s
power, and the statute should be upheld on Equality or Status-quo-consistent
grounds. Second, Justice Breyer posits that the dual for-clause rule may
actually strengthen the President by keeping in place an official that the
Commission would like to fire but the President wants to keep.88 This is
consistent with the Pareto view. Finally, Breyer makes the Prioritarian
argument of the Morrison majority: “Where a ‘for cause’ provision is so
unlikely to restrict Presidential power and so likely to further a legitimate
institutional need,” it should be upheld.89 Here, the public benefits
outweigh the incremental loss of power to the Executive.
The Historical view appears in many opinions as well, though typically
as a rhetorical flourish. For example, in Clinton v. City of New York, Justice
Kennedy, in concurrence, argues that the line-item veto is unconstitutional
because it increased “the power of the President beyond what the Framers
envisioned.”90 Justice Kennedy does not actually show that the President’s
power has increased beyond what the Framers envisioned. He does not
discuss what the Framers envisioned at all, or cite any evidence. Indeed,
the reasoning of the opinion is formalist rather than historical. He objects
to the line-item veto because it gives the President what he thinks of as
legislative power.91

86 This seems to be what Scalia meant when he criticized the majority for using a “balancing
test.” Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87 Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 524-25 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 525-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 532 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91 See id. at 451 (“The law establishes a new mechanism which gives the President the sole
ability . . . to extract further concessions from Congress. The law is the functional equivalent of a
line item veto . . . .”).
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The Historical view plays a more interesting role in Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube.
As to whether there is imperative necessity for such powers, it is relevant to
note the gap that exists between the President’s paper powers and his real
powers. The Constitution does not disclose the measure of the actual controls
wielded by the modern presidential office. That instrument must be
understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a government hoped for, not
as a blueprint of the Government that is. Vast accretions of federal power,
eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of
presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that
do not show on the face of the Constitution.
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head in whose
choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and
expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far
overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear. No
other personality in public life can begin to compete with him in access to
the public mind through modern methods of communications. By his
prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion he exerts a
leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his power which
often cancels their effectiveness.
Moreover, rise of the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional
supplement to real executive power. No appraisal of his necessities is realistic
which overlooks that he heads a political system as well as a legal system. Party
loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend his effective
control into branches of government other than his own and he often may win,
as a political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution . . . . I
cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer if the Court refuses
further to aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively
immune from judicial review, at the expense of Congress.92

In the first sentence, Justice Jackson rejects the formalist approach. The
eighteenth-century President had few law enforcement officers at his
disposal. His entire legal staff consisted of a part-time Attorney General.93
He did not command a standing army of consequential size or influence.94

92 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted).
93 About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/U8XL-ECC7].
94 See RUSSELL FRANK WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY 41 (1973) (“Suspicion of standing armies remained
strong in all regions of the country . . . . The financial resources of the new government remained
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He did not lead a well–organized political party.95 He could not communicate
instantly to the entire country. All this had changed by 1952, the year that the
case was decided. Two points can be distinguished. A formalist approach that,
for example, endorsed the President’s authority over a vast army based on his
commander-in-chief power allows him to dominate the other institutions of
government in a way that he could not in the eighteenth century. Moreover,
formalism is helpless to undo the accretions to presidential power that arguably
do violate the rules—for example, the President’s authority to make policy
through regulation—because the Court lacks the political power and will.96
The executive branch is much more powerful than it was at the Founding.
Jackson does not say or imply that courts should try to recreate the
eighteenth-century balance of power. Unlike Kennedy, Jackson realizes that
this would be meaningless—because the original balance of powers cannot be
identified—or impossible—because a return to the original balance of powers
would not be tolerated politically. In the end, Jackson does not endorse the
Historical view. Instead, he uses the eighteenth-century baseline to argue
that the Court should not tolerate further growth of executive power except
when authorized by Congress. When would Congress hand over additional
authority to the Executive? Presumably, either when the authority does not
result in any weakening of Congress, perhaps because it is merely formal or
even ceremonial, or when Congress itself benefits because it expects the
Executive to use the additional power in a way that furthers Congress’s
interests. The first is Status-quo-consistent; the second is Pareto or Prioritarian.

too limited, the prestige and popular standing of the government too precarious to permit ambitious
military programs.”).
95 See L. SANDY MAISEL & MARK D. BREWER, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA:
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 26 (6th ed. 2012) (“[P]arties were weak and fragile in the early years
of the nineteenth century. Partisan loyalties were not well established; political leaders themselves
shifted frequently.”).
96 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935), for example,
announced that “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an
unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable,” but this
pronouncement was an illustratively abortive effort to impose limits on that ability. See Douglas H.
Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251,
257-59 (2010) (discussing political backlash to Schechter Poultry and the Court’s subsequent retreat
from the nondelegation doctrine).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS: REVISITING CLAIMS ABOUT
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
A. Recent “Imperial Presidency” Claims
During the Bush Administration, many critics of the presidency argued
that Bush had “aggrandized” executive power, defying Congress in ways that
his predecessors had not.97 Bush defined a private criminal organization as a
belligerent, ordered military forces to kill members of that organization
without judicial process or detain them without charges, refused to comply
with the laws of war with respect to lawful combatants in Afghanistan, and
authorized torture and wiretapping; many of these acts violated statutes.98
Bush also drew on a broad interpretation of his commander-in-chief powers
to justify disregarding statutes that he did not agree with.99
Many commentators gave special attention to torture.100 Congress passed
the Anti-Torture Statute in 1994, which in plain terms bars persons acting
under color of law from engaging in torture.101 The Bush Administration
nonetheless authorized “enhanced interrogation techniques,” including
waterboarding, which by any definition amounts to torture.102 These
techniques were used against at least three detainees, and possibly more.103
Thus, it appears that the Executive flagrantly disregarded the will of
Congress. The balance of powers broke down.

97 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Opinion, The Imperial Presidency, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/AR2007011201952.html [https:
//perma.cc/X8TT-KGJX] (arguing that Bush Administration antiterrorism action was driven not
by policy need but by intentional efforts to expand executive power); supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
98 For an overwrought but comprehensive account of these actions, see CHARLIE SAVAGE,
TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008).
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2009); Editorial, Prosecute Torturers and Their Bosses, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/opinion/prosecute-torturers-and-their-bosses.
html [https://perma.cc/L2DZ-3MLZ]; Lithwick, supra note 97.
101 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2016).
102 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1571-72 (2007) (discussing “interrogation methods that could not
possibly be described as humane,” such as waterboarding, “in which the prisoner is smothered with
water to make him feel he is drowning”; detention in a “cold cell,” “in which the prisoner is stripped
naked, repeatedly doused with cold water and held in a cell kept nearly fifty degrees”; forced nudity;
and the use of attack dogs to induce panic).
103 Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Libyan Alleges Waterboarding by C.I.A., Report Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/middleeast/libyan-alleges-waterboardingby-cia-human-rights-watch-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/PES3-7QRY].

1702

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1677

By contrast, Jack Goldsmith argues that the Bush Administration
authorized these techniques only after extensive legal analysis, and time and
again faced constraints from outside the executive branch.104 The CIA
ensured that various executive branch institutions endorsed, or at least gave
silent acquiescence to, coercive interrogation.105 CIA officials made a
presentation to members of the House and Senate intelligence committees.
After the program was put into effect and information about it leaked out,
various members of the public—journalists, lawyers, politicians—raised a hue
and cry. The Bush Administration was forced to ask inspectors general to
evaluate the program, and in doing so, used a mechanism put into place by
Congress in the Inspectors General Act. Congress also passed a new law that
banned torture. The Bush Administration stopped using waterboarding in
2007,106 and the Obama Administration has repudiated it as well.107 Although
Goldsmith’s account of “pushback” against presidential power relies to a large
extent on public pressure, he gives some credit to Congress and suggests that
the system of separation of powers was vindicated.108
How can one rigorously evaluate this debate? The arguments of many of
the critics of the Bush Administration were formalist. Those critics argued
that Bush upset the balance of power because he disregarded statutes that,
under the constitutional rules, he was required to obey. Goldsmith’s response
is a classically substantive claim that, while the rules were evaded, the balance
of power in substance was not overturned. Forces other than Congress made
up for Congress’s failure or inability to constrain the President.
Goldsmith does not show, however, that the normatively correct balance
of power was maintained.109 He does not, for example, make a historical
argument that Bush acted consistently with the Founding-era balance of
104
105
106

GOLDSMITH, supra note 64, at 86-112.
Id. at 96-98.
See Mark Mazzetti, Letters Give C.I.A. Tactics a Legal Rationale, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/washington/27intel.html [https://perma.cc/J8XT-W7JH] (citing
waterboarding as a particularly severe interrogation tactic used primarily in the first two years after
the 9/11 attacks); see also David Morgan, Bush Puts CIA Prisons Under Geneva Conventions, REUTERS
(July 20, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/20/us-security-interrogations-idUSN20295
19720070720 [https://perma.cc/J8QM-H9A6] (reporting the Bush Administration’s July 2007 order
that CIA interrogators comply with the Geneva Conventions against torture).
107 See Clyde Haberman, As Another Anniversary Passes, Still Waiting for Justice, N.Y. TIMES:
CITY ROOM (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/as-another-anniv
ersary-passes-still-waiting-for-justice/?scp=3&sq=obama%20waterboarding&st=cse [https://perma.cc/EL
U4-CJPN] (“[W]aterboarding . . . is a technique that the Obama [A]dministration agrees amounts to
torture.”); see also Savage & Shane, supra note 103 (reporting on the Obama Administration’s “truth
commission” to establish a definitive account of interrogation and detention in the post-9/11 era, as well
as the Administration’s repudiation of Bush-era interrogation techniques).
108 GOLDSMITH, supra note 64, at 119-21.
109 See generally Baher Azmy, An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency: Some Reflections on Jack
Goldsmith’s Power and Constraint, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 23 (2012).
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power, as many critics say he should. Nor does he show that the external
forces—the media, public interest groups, and so forth—were powerful
enough to create a balance of power that, even if not historically correct, is
normatively desirable. An optimistic view is that these forces ensured that
the President’s actions advanced the public interest in a way that Congress
approved. Congress did not fight back but nonetheless benefited, and hence
the Prioritarian or Pareto definitions were satisfied.
Thus, the debate between Goldsmith and his critics cannot be joined until
the underlying normative benchmark is clarified. If critics believe that only
the historical balance of power is normatively justified, while Goldsmith takes
a Pareto or Prioritarian view, then the real argument is about what is the right
normative baseline, not about whether the ACLU or New York Times
constrained the Bush Administration. However, an alternative view, which I
pursue in the Conclusion, is that this is not the right way to argue about
presidential power. How exactly the President and Congress divide the
political payoffs from their interactions is less important than whether those
interactions benefit the public.110
As if to prove the elasticity of the concept of power, conservatives who
defended Bush’s use of power have come to the conclusion that Obama is the
“imperial president.”111 They point to his decision not to enforce the
immigration laws against certain young people who lack immigration
papers,112 to use waivers to undermine the No Child Left Behind law,113 and
to launch a military intervention in Libya without congressional
authorization.114 Obama has also maintained most of the features of Bush’s
approach to counterterrorism, expanding the drone program under which the
110 Cf. Magill, supra note 15, at 629 (criticizing the notion, which many scholars implicitly rely
upon, that “[d]iscussions of the need to prevent aggrandizement or to preserve balance among the
departments assume that balance among the three branches is an end in itself ”).
111 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Opinion, The Imperial Presidency Revisited, WASH. POST
(July 5, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-imperial-presidencyrevisited/2012/07/05/gJQAR66PQW_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q3KU-QCD4] (“During the Bush 43
years, we were repeatedly treated to garment-rending about the imperial presidency . . . . Yet the
current [Obama] [A]dministration’s imperiousness has earned little comparable attention.”);
Kimberley Strassel, Opinion, Obama’s Imperial Presidency, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2012), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304141204577506881495497626.html [https://perma.cc/6F
QX-P3CJ] (“Mr. Obama has granted himself unprecedented power.”).
112 Charles Krauthammer, Opinion, The Immigration No-Brainer, WASH. POST (July 10, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-immigration-no-brainer/2014
/07/10/a7e8723c-085a-11e4-bbf1-cc51275e7f8f_story.html [https://perma.cc/5TWV-F5EJ].
113 See Caitlin Emma, Are New No Child Waivers Illegal?, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2013),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/arne-duncan-no-child-left-behind-waivers-095818 [https://
perma.cc/A7XR-SRQ6] (quoting conservative scholars critical of President Obama’s decision to
grant certain states and school districts waivers to No Child Left Behind).
114 Editorial, Obama’s Illegal War, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2011/mar/18/obamas-illegal-war/ [https://perma.cc/K5EA-GRRC].
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executive branch determines who will be killed overseas, including American
citizens.115 Obama has not cited his constitutional powers as enthusiastically
as Bush did,116 but Obama’s lawyers have also not repudiated the Article II
theory and could draw on it if they believed it necessary.117 The ambiguity of
the constitutional baseline also makes it difficult to compare the horizontal
power of Bush and Obama.
B. Doctrinal Controversies
A large number of doctrinal controversies involve scholars and judges
arguing that a particular rule gives the President or Congress too much or too
little power relative to the other. The debates involve such questions as
whether the Executive can refuse to enforce the law;118 whether Congress can
control the President’s management of military operations119 or foreign
relations more generally;120 whether the President enjoys emergency powers
that allow him to disregard statutes during crises;121 whether the President
can keep secrets from Congress;122 and whether the President and other
115 Scott Shane, Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth: U.S. Is Often Unsure About Who Will Die,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/drone-strikes-reveal-unco
mfortable-truth-us-is-often-unsure-about-who-will-die.html [https://perma.cc/R39R-FNQS].
116 See Gordon Silverstein, The Law: Bush, Cheney, and the Separation of Powers: A Lasting Legal
Legacy?, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q., Dec. 2009, at 878, 883, 893 (contrasting Bush’s expansive
approach to executive power with Obama’s more traditional approach).
117 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal
Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (2013) (giving the Obama Administration’s argument for
military operations in Libya without express Congressional authorization as an example of an appeal
to historical practice to expand presidential power).
118 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
113, 123-135 (1993) (arguing that the executive branch must follow judicial interpretation but may
“shad[e] the doctrine slightly to permit more executive power”); cf. Presidential Authority to Decline
to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 201-202 (1994) (asserting that when a law
infringes on the Executive’s constitutional powers, the President can “decline to abide by it”).
119 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947-50 (2008) (contending that Congress has
historically been and should continue to be “an active participant in setting the terms of battle”).
120 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 540-55 (1999) (explaining the nature of the powers
granted to the President and to Congress over foreign affairs).
121 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047-1056 (2004)
(maintaining that “[t]he Executive should be given the power to act unilaterally only for the briefest
period—long enough for the legislature to convene and consider the matter, but no longer. If the
legislature is already in session, one week seems the longest tolerable period; if not, two weeks at
most”); cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605,
614-620 (2003) (arguing that expanded executive power during emergencies does not have a
tendency to persist after the emergency has ended).
122 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 489, 533-34 (2007) (asserting that in circumstances where executive secrets are outside
Congress’s legislative and oversight powers, the executive should not be forced to divulge them).
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executive officials enjoy immunities from prosecution for actions they
undertake in the course of their duties.123 I will discuss two of these
controversies: the removal power and the legislative veto.
1. The Removal Power
Presidents and their academic allies contend that the power to remove
executive branch officials is inherent in executive power.124 If the President
cannot remove officials who act contrary to the President’s wishes, then the
President cannot control that person and thus cannot control the executive
branch. Yet Congress has, from time to time, placed various limits on the
President’s power to remove executive branch officials: notably, the for-cause
restriction that was approved in Morrison and the double for-cause restriction
that was struck down in Free Enterprise Fund.125
As we saw earlier,126 the debate about the removal power has largely
proceeded along the lines dictated by the balance-of-power metaphor. Critics
of for-cause requirements, like Justice Scalia in his Morrison dissent,127 argue
that for-cause requirements tilt the balance of power in Congress’s favor;
defenders, like Justice Breyer in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent,128 argue that
for-cause requirements do not upset the balance of power.
It should now be clear that these claims about the effect of for-cause
requirements on the balance of power are nearly impossible to evaluate.
Scalia’s argument suggests that the for-cause requirement will shift the
surplus in Congress’s favor; it is not clear that this would be so. Conceivably,
the independent counsel could increase the President’s power by creating a
greater risk of sanction for wayward executive agents who violate the law
where the President does not want them to.129 Indeed, President Carter
backed and signed the Ethics in Government Act,130 which created the
independent counsel statute; he may well have believed that presidential
power would increase if the public’s confidence in the presidency could be
123 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1612, 1612-16 (1997) (delineating how “nonstatutory review” can be used by the courts to
exercise control over executive action).
124 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126 See supra subsection I.A.
127 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
129 A similar point is made by Justice Breyer in Free Enterprise Fund regarding the potential for
the executive branch to empower impartial adjudication and technical regulation by constraining the
President’s ability to terminate executive branch officials. Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 522 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824-67 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
5 & 28 U.S.C.).
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repaired after Watergate. On this view, the statute increases the President’s
vertical power (his ability to ensure that agents implement his policies),
which may make up for any (possibly trivial) loss in horizontal power.
Even if the independent counsel statute reduced the President’s power—either
absolutely or only relative to Congress’s—the question is how much it
reduced his power. It is difficult, probably impossible, to answer this question.
As Adrian Vermeule has recently pointed out, the extent to which an agency
is “independent,” in the sense of being able to make decisions that do not
follow the political interests of the Executive, depends a great deal on political
context and public opinion.131 Some agencies that are nominally independent
are in fact sensitive to the President’s agenda, and other agencies that are
nominally nonindependent are in fact able to deviate from the President’s
agenda.132 For example, the Bush Administration suffered a political setback
when it fired lawyers in the nonindependent Justice Department, suggesting
that political norms confer independence, of a sort, on that agency.133 By
contrast, according to Vermeule, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
enjoys statutory independence but in fact is highly politicized.134 Thus, if
Congress passes a law that restricts the President’s power over the Justice
Department, it may weaken the President excessively (and that may well be the
final verdict on the independent counsel statute, which was allowed to expire
in 1999).135 But if Congress passes a law that restricts the President’s power over
the NLRB, it may improve the balance of power. A court charged with maintaining
the balance of power would need to be attuned to this political context.
The baseline problem poses an even greater issue. If the independent
counsel statute reduced the President’s horizontal power, was this reduction
a violation of the constitutional baseline, or did it restore the balance of
powers to the appropriate constitutional baseline? Scalia was notably silent
on this issue, referring only to our “former constitutional system,”136 which
may refer to the system that existed just prior to the decision, the system at
the Founding, or the system at some other time period. The problem for
Scalia was that if the Founding provides the baseline, then surely the
independent counsel statute is constitutional as nearly everyone agrees that
the President is significantly more powerful relative to Congress today, or in
1988 when the case was decided, than he was at the time of the Founding. If
131 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2013).
132 Id. at 1165-66.
133 Id. at 1167.
134 Id. at 1179-80.
135 Carol Elder Bruce, Opinion, An Independent Counsel Law Needs to Be Restored, N.Y. TIMES:
ROOM FOR DEBATE (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-good-

come-of-watergate/an-independent-counsel-law-needs-to-be-restored [https://perma.cc/UQV6-XBFE].
136 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 714-15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the baseline is instead the balance of power on the day before the statute was
enacted (as entailed by the Status-quo-consistent definition), the question is
why that date should be the baseline.
It is, of course, possible to argue for or against for-cause requirements on
policy grounds. One might criticize them on the grounds that bureaucrats
who cannot be disciplined by the President will produce worse policy
outcomes than bureaucrats who can be, presumably because the President is
responsive to democratic pressures.137 Or one might defend for-cause
requirements on the grounds that Presidents pressure agencies to produce
outcomes that benefit favored constituents rather than the public interest;
only independence would enable agencies to resist this pressure; and agency
officials themselves care about the public interest. Both of these arguments
are theoretically coherent and amenable to empirical testing, and it might turn
out that some agencies should be independent and others should not be.138
My point is not that arguments about administrative structure are
impossible to resolve. It is that such arguments should not take place through
the metaphor of the balance of power, which provides no guidance to courts,
academics, commentators, or the public—and obscures the issues at stake. It
is hard to believe that the balance-of-power idea actually explains the
outcomes in the removal cases. If the cases display any logic at all, they
suggest a generalized suspicion of bureaucratic innovation on the part of the
Supreme Court, leading to a presumption against such innovation unless the
innovation is incremental and seems likely to improve regulatory outcomes.139
2. The Legislative Veto
In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that
authorized one house of Congress to veto a decision by the executive branch
to permit a removable alien to stay in the United States.140 The majority’s
formalist opinion held that the statute violated presentment (because the
purported veto was in effect legislation not signed by the President) and
bicameralism (because, under this arrangement, only one house would need
to approve a resolution purporting to invalidate the executive branch’s
decision), and left it at that.141 Justice Powell’s concurrence, however, argued
137 Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 101-03 (1994).
138 But arguments from democratic theory should probably be avoided. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (“[J]udicial enforcement of presidential
removal authority will not reliably promote presidential control or democratic accountability.”).
139 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2012) (discussing the role of tradition in separation-of-powers disputes).
140 462 U.S. 919, 923, 959 (1983).
141 Id. at 946-51.
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that the legislative veto should be struck down because it represents an
excessive accumulation of power in Congress, albeit judicial rather than
executive power.142 Justice White’s dissent put even more emphasis on the
balance of powers, but argued that the legislative veto ensured that excessive
authority was not put in the hands of the Executive.143 For example, “In the
energy field, the legislative veto served to balance broad delegations in
legislation emerging from the energy crisis of the 1970’s.”144 Justice White
argued that the legislative veto was the mechanism that Congress used to
ensure that a balance of power remained between it and the Executive despite
the massive delegations of authority to executive branch agencies that took
place over the course of the twentieth century.145 Invalidating the legislative
veto, then, meant that Congress would have no means of checking executive
power, short of refusing to delegate power in the first place. Justice White’s
argument echoes Justice Jackson’s argument that the historical shift in the
balance of power in the President’s favor justifies judicial opposition to
actions that further strengthen the President (as in Youngstown) or judicial
support of actions that strengthen Congress (as in Chadha).
Many academics took up this view. In the words of Professors Eskridge
and Ferejohn, “Chadha invalidated legislative veto provisions in hundreds of
federal statutes and was potentially far-reaching judicial activism, unsettling
the careful balance between the federal Legislative and Executive Branches.”146
Not all academics agree with Eskridge and Ferejohn, or Justice White, that
the legislative veto is needed to maintain the balance of power; but the debate
has in large part focused on the question of how the legislative veto affects
the balance of power, with some arguing that the legislative veto excessively
favors Congress and others arguing that it does not.147

142
143
144
145
146

Id. at 966-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 970-74 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 971.
Id. at 970-71.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture: Deliberation–Respecting
Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1296-97 (2009).
147 See, e.g., Anthony M. Bottenfield, Congressional Creativity: The Post-Chadha Struggle for
Agency Control in the Era of Presidential Signing Statements, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1125, 1148 (2008)
(asking whether “the post-Chadha framework leave[s] Congress with necessary tools to maintain the
balance of power with the executive in the policymaking arena”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 540-43 (1992) (arguing that the legislative
veto was needed to ensure balance of powers from the perspective of the original understanding of
the Constitution); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1825-26 (1996)
(same); Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel Statutes in the
Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 419-20 (2000) (discussing
the debate over whether Chadha upset or restored the balance of powers).
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In an earlier Article on the legislative veto, Professors Eskridge and
Ferejohn employed a spatial model to defend Justice White’s position.148
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that under the original understanding, Congress
had greater influence on legislation than the Executive because of its role in
approving legislation. The President’s veto power can be used to block some
legislation and influence other legislation on the margin (when Congress
writes to avoid the veto), but presidential influence is nonetheless rather
modest because Congress initiates legislation and can override the veto. Thus,
legislative outcomes will be closer to Congress’s ideal point than to the
President’s ideal point. Under the modern system of agency regulation,
however, the President has significantly greater influence on outcomes.
Agencies can issue rules, and the President appoints and typically can remove
agency heads. Although Congress can legislate in order to reverse rules that
it does not like, an agency that seeks to advance the President’s agenda will
nonetheless be able to enact rules that are closer to the President’s ideal point
than to Congress’s. Agencies do so because the power to initiate legislation,
which greatly influences the ultimate outcome, has shifted from Congress to
the agency where regulatory power has been delegated, and congressional
efforts to revise regulations it dislikes requires a supermajority because of the
President’s veto threat. Thus, we have an imbalance of power, one that
necessitates a corrective mechanism.
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that in fact Congress has understood as
much, and implemented a corrective mechanism in the form of the legislative
veto—indeed, Congress put the legislative veto in hundreds of statutes.149
Because the legislative veto enables Congress to invalidate an agency rule
without obtaining the President’s consent, it can rein in the agencies and force
them to implement rules closer to Congress’s ideal point. Thus, consistent
with the understanding of the Founders, the policy outcome is more closely
aligned with Congress’s ideal point than with the President’s, even if the
institutional structure differs.
The whole argument is puzzling. Eskridge and Ferejohn show that the
legislative veto “offsets” to a certain extent the additional power transferred
to the Executive with the rise of the administrative state, but they ignore all
the other ways in which constitutional and political developments have
affected the “balance” between the branches. For instance, the Executive has
also obtained power relative to Congress as a result of developments in
communications technology. According to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s logic, that
imbalance would justify further constraints—say, a one-house veto, which
Eskridge and Ferejohn suggest is constitutionally defensible only under
148
149

See generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 147.
Id. at 563-64.
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certain assumptions.150 The Executive also has more employees at its disposal,
and a greater budget. Surely those developments affect the balance of power
as well. Or one could argue that the courts have in the last decade usurped
the Executive’s power by exerting control over Executive detention,151
justifying any effort by the Executive to seize some judicial powers. For all
the sophistication of their method, the Eskridge and Ferejohn argument has an
air of unreality, as though the branches were engaging in gymnastic maneuvers
in a vacuum rather than responding to public opinion, parties, and the media.
And then there is the baseline problem. Eskridge and Ferejohn acknowledge
that there is no reason to use the Founding-era balance of powers as the baseline
for determining the constitutionality of the legislative veto.152 We may instead
think that the President should today have a greater influence on policy
outcomes than at the Founding. One could give a number of reasons. Today,
Congress is larger and more diverse than it was at the Founding, possibly
interfering with internal deliberation and coordination and producing worse policy
outcomes. Today, the national government has much greater responsibilities,
requiring quick and even continuous reactions to changing events—something
Congress is institutionally incapable of providing. The President now has a more
unified national constituency, but during the Founding and up until the Civil War,
people were more inclined to think of the nation as a collective of states rather
than as a single national population, justifying greater influence for Congress.
But if we accept these reasons for rejecting the Founding-era baseline, we do
not know what baseline should be used.
Another problem with Eskridge and Ferejohn’s argument is that it assumes,
without any evidence, that the legislative veto actually gives Congress any
power.153 Fear of executive branch retaliation may cause Congress not to
threaten to use legislative vetoes, or to threaten to use them only sparingly.
Or Congress may have additional methods for influencing policy outcomes.
It can write more detailed statutes; it can threaten to withhold funds; it can
harass agency officials or, conversely, shield them from the influence of the
Executive with for-cause protections. Alternatively, perhaps the ability to
150
151

Id. at 540-43.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (recognizing habeas jurisdiction over
Guantanamo Bay detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006) (providing that,
despite provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Supreme Court could review the
executive detention and military commission trials of Guantanamo Bay detainees).
152 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 147, at 556-57.
153 See generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 147. At least one scholar finds no evidence for
this assumption in the area of education law. See generally Jessica Korn, Improving the Policymaking
Process by Protecting the Separation of Powers: Chadha & the Legislative Vetoes in Education Statutes, 26
POLITY 677 (1994). For a similar view based on an examination of the evidence, see generally Harold
H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative
Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
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enact legislative vetoes causes Congress to delegate excessively; a prohibition
on legislative vetoes (like the nondelegation doctrine itself, which Eskridge
and Ferejohn support154) may make Congress more reluctant to confer power
on the Executive. Indeed, Eskridge and Ferejohn suggest that Congress can
respond to the invalidation of the legislative veto by delegating less, in which
case the legislative veto would not upset the balance of power.155
It is quite difficult to say what the effect of the invalidation of the
legislative veto might have on the balance of powers. Even if one can describe
the effect with any degree of confidence, it is even harder to say whether the
resulting balance of powers is constitutional or not. It would be best to do
without the balance-of-powers metaphor altogether, and look for an alternative
means for evaluating reforms of institutional structure.
C. The Underenforcement Controversy
In recent years, President Obama has come under criticism for failing to
enforce certain federal laws. The most sustained criticism has been directed
at two immigration orders—one directing immigration authorities to defer
removal of children who were brought into the country illegally (DACA), and
another directing authorities to defer removal of unauthorized migrants who
are parents of citizens or lawful permanent residents (DAPA).156 Obama has
also been accused of “underenforcing” the Affordable Care Act,157 federal
drug laws,158 and No Child Left Behind.159
Some critics simply argue that the President has an obligation to enforce
the law, and policies like DACA and DAPA violate that obligation.160
However, Congress has not appropriated enough funds to enable the
President to deport more than a small fraction of illegal immigrants,161 and
the President cannot be expected to do the impossible. A more sophisticated
154
155
156

Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 147, at 558.
Id. at 545-46.
Matt Ford, A Ruling Against the Obama Administration on Immigration, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/fifth-circuit-obama-immigration/
415077/ [https://perma.cc/TR5D-XC5W].
157 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
749-54 (2014) (discussing how President Obama has delayed for substantial periods the enforcement
of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act).
158 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783 (2013).
159 Emma, supra note 113.
160 See generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 158.
161 See Tom Cohen, Obama Seeks Emergency Immigration Funds, More Authority, CNN (July 8,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/08/politics/immigration/ [https://perma.cc/J6VY-537V] (noting
that President Obama sought an emergency funding request from Congress for $3.7 billion, but
the Senate’s immigration reform bill would have appropriated $30 billion in proposed border
security funding).
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strain of criticism recognizes that by tradition and (supposedly) the text of the
Constitution, the President enjoys independent authority as the Executive.
Prosecutorial discretion, for example, is an entrenched feature of American legal
practice, and has been for centuries.162 The challenge is to reconcile the tradition
of independence and the obligation to enforce the law. Zachary Price tries to
resolve this tension by declaring that the President cannot issue “categorical”
pronouncements about enforcement but is allowed to make case-by-case
decisions, or delegate case-by-case discretion to subordinates.163 This argument
makes little sense. Categorical pronouncements have frequently been used to
direct executive branch subordinates,164 and they provide greater transparency,
predictability, and guidance than case-by-case delegation does.165
What limits are there on presidential power, then? Could the President refuse
to enforce the tax code against people he finds sympathetic, or he genuinely
believes deserve tax relief, or against his political supporters? Adam Cox and
Cristina M. Rodríguez, in a lengthy defense of DACA and DAPA, argue that
there are certain “limiting principles.”166 Ironically, they find those limiting
principles in congressional action. For example, Congress could put limits on the
President’s discretion, use its appropriations power to push back on presidential
action, or limit the President’s power to supervise subordinates.167 They also
argue that, as a practical matter, public opinion and the bureaucracy constrain the
President.168 If subordinates are reluctant to carry out the President’s order, this
is itself a kind of check on presidential power. These arguments are similar to
Goldsmith’s.169 They also echo the arguments of defenders of unilateral executive
warmaking power. John Yoo, for example, argues that his broad interpretation of
the Vesting and Commander-in-Chief Clauses does not upset the balance of
power because Congress can check the President by denying him appropriations.170
162 See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law,
9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010).
163 Price, supra note 157, at 675. For similar arguments, see generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 158.
164 See generally Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
795 (2010) (providing an overview of the Bush Administration’s pervasive use of blanket nonenforcement
policies to pursue policy objectives).
165 See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015) (defending DACA and DAPA as more transparent, predictable, and centralized
than individualized discretion). Their argument has a clever jiu-jitsu element to it. Though President
Obama’s critics point out that he violated the “rule of law” by failing to enforce immigration law, Cox
and Rodríguez argue that he actually advanced the “rule of law” by enforcing the law in a more
“transparent” and “predictable” manner. Id. at 174.
166 Id. at 210-14.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 143 n.114, 170 n.187.
169 See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
170 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 295 (1996).
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These arguments could be interpreted as asserting the Minimalist
conception of the balance of power. As long as Congress retains some means
to check the Executive, the new assertion of executive power does not upset
the balance. It is doubtful, however, that these authors would accept this
interpretation. The Minimalist view implies that an adequate response to a
complaint about presidential overreaching is to point out that there remain
“checks” on the President’s power, as if the President could go too far only by
abolishing Congress, the courts, and civil society. The authors seem to employ
a more robust sense of the balance of powers—perhaps the Equality, or
Prioritarian, or Originalist sense—but they do not articulate it and do not try
to show that the constitutional schemes they envision are consistent with it.171
The balance of power argument, the talk of checks and balances, is a
sideshow. These scholars are most persuasive when they abandon these
concepts and simply make an argument that the particular problem at hand
requires an institutional structure that gives the President a primary, but not
unlimited, role. Cox and Rodríguez’s best argument is that DACA and DAPA
are justified by the simple fact that Congress has not given the President
resources to remove all illegal immigrants; there is a broad consensus that the
limited resources should be used for criminals; and the enforcement system
will be fairer, more transparent, and more efficient if the criteria for removal
are published rather than concealed.172 Notice that this argument does not
appeal to checks and balances.
Goldsmith’s best argument is that counterterrorism requires secrecy and
speed, and so it cannot be debated openly in Congress; that the executive
branch has (in his view) implemented adequate review procedures to
minimize error; and that the media, leaks from the executive branch, and the
vestigial roles of Congress and the courts further minimize errors while not
posing an excessive threat to secret operations.173 Agree with him or not, one
need not invoke the balance of power.
Whether we are arguing about “underenforcement” of statutes or defiance
of Congress and the courts, we can debate how the President should act—and
what powers he should be allowed to have—without falling back on the
balance of powers. The concept has long been ceremonial rather than useful;
a nod to the Founders in times of turmoil. It can now be abandoned.
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Yoo, however, has tried to defend his view by citing history. Id.
See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-08.
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CONCLUSION
The balance-of-powers metaphor has had a good run, but it is time to put
it to rest. It provides no practical guidance to courts when they adjudicate
disputes between branches. It rests on empirical premises about interbranch
struggle that have little support in American history, while ignoring other
empirical factors (notably, the party system) that are vastly more important.
It does not reflect any reasonable constitutional goals. We can agree with
Madison that all government powers should not be located in a single
individual or group of magistrates, but once we rule out this extreme
outcome, the concept of “balance” is too vague and slippery to serve as a
workable guiding principle.
It also distracts from the central question of optimal government
structure. The reason we should care about constraints on the removal power
is not that those constraints upset some balance between Congress and the
President. The reason is that those constraints may improve or worsen the
performance of the bureaucracy. To determine whether they do, one must
consider the particular body in question and ask why the constraints might be
useful or harmful. Is this body likely to be captured by industry? Is it likely
to be used for partisan purposes? In answering these questions, one should
look at the history of the body (if there is any) and other elements of its
structure. For example, an agency that is staffed by highly trained professionals
with a narrowly defined mission might be less susceptible to industry capture;
and an agency that can be manipulated so as to improve the President’s
reelection prospects might be more susceptible to partisan abuse. As a result,
most countries give independence to the central bank, as has the United
States—and there is no need to worry about whether doing so upsets the
balance of power among the branches. For other agencies, tradeoffs point in
different directions, resulting in various optimal levels of independence.
Again, balance plays no role in the analysis. Finally, in cases where the
Executive claims the power to violate laws, or not to defend those laws in
courts, or to modify appropriations or impound funds, the question again is
whether outcomes are likely to be better if the Executive can act without
congressional consent or not. One might believe that in some cases the answer
is yes (for example, congressional micromanaging of military operations) and
in other cases no (for example, impoundment or line-item vetoes) without
also being required to take a position as to whether these views are consistent
with some overriding balance. Policy experts already know this; it is time that
judges and law professors learn it too.

